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Introduction
Climate-change litigation is surging in the face of scientific consensus that Earth’s
warming over the past century will soon dramatically interfere with human and natural systems.1
Given the complexity of the problem, climate change plaintiffs often bring creative claims using
“unconventional” legal tools outside the usual realm of environmental statutes.2 One such tool is
the public trust doctrine, an ancient doctrine rooted in the writings of Justinian that exemplifies the
democratic principle of anti-monopolization over public resources. 3 The public trust doctrine
recognizes that sovereigns have an inherent duty as an incident of their sovereignty to act as a
trustee over those resources.4 Although the doctrine was traditionally invoked to protect navigable
waters for public use—particularly in England and the United States5—courts across the globe
have expanded the doctrine’s scope in numerous contexts.6 Indeed, the ancient doctrine’s
continuing relevance to natural resources law is due to its adaptable nature.7

*3L, Lewis and Clark Law School.
**Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
1
Earth Sci. Commc’ns Team, Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space
Admin., https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (last updated Sept. 28, 2021) (stating that at least 97% of
climate scientists agree that climate change is primarily a result of human activities).
2
See Mary Christina Wood & Charles W. Woodward, IV, Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the Constitutional Right
to a Healthy Climate System: Judicial Recognition at Last, 6 Wash. J. of Envtl. L. & Pol’y, 633, 643-45 (2016)
(describing the need for a “macro approach” to climate change litigation and distinguishing such an approach from
climate change litigation relying on statutory or nuisance law).
3
See generally Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine, 44
B.C. Envtl. Affairs L. Rev. 1 (2017).
4
See Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A Sustainable Middle Ground, 35
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 287, 311 (2010) (stating that “public trust principles have been described as an essential attribute
of sovereignty across cultures and across millennia”).
5
See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (upholding a state legislature’s invalidation of a former
legislative grant of submerged lands beneath Chicago harbor to a private railroad company as inconsistent with the
sovereign trust over navigable waters); but see Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)
(explaining, in a suit by one state to enjoin noxious gas discharges from another state, that each “state has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain”).
6
See infra pp. 5-6.
7
See Ved P. Nanda & William K. Ris, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to International
Environmental Protection, 5 Ecology L.Q. 291, 296 (1976) (“[T]he doctrine has qualities of breadth and flexibility
that make it particularly useful to the solution of complex international environmental problems.”).

Pemberton, 1
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4023801

In the climate-change context, courts and scholars typically refer to the public trust as an
“atmospheric trust.”8 Plaintiffs bringing atmospheric trust claims often face issues of justiciability 9
that do not arise when courts apply the public trust doctrine to long-recognized public trust
resources—navigable waterways. Thus, the doctrine’s utility as a legal tool in the fight to combat
climate change has had mixed success, with courts offering varying (and sometimes inconsistent)
interpretations. Nonetheless, understanding the impending threats posed by climate change,
several courts have concluded that the atmosphere is within the doctrine’s scope. 10 Numerous
others have at the very least recognized the public’s strong interest in a properly functioning
climate system.11 To that end, this paper explores two analytical frameworks—1) constitutional
recognition and 2) inter-resource affectation—modeled from emerging best practices in
atmospheric trust and public trust doctrine cases for international courts to employ when they
evaluate atmospheric trust claims.
This paper maintains that the atmosphere is protected by the public trust doctrine whenever
plaintiffs make claims based on constitutional language that establishes public rights in or the
sovereign’s responsibility for air, climate, a healthy environment, or natural resources generally.
Many courts have rooted their support for an atmospheric trust in constitutional language, even
absent an explicit reference to air or climate. 12 Where the relevant constitution establishes common
rights in a healthy environment or natural resources, courts have readily embraced the concept of

8

See Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, No Ordinary Lawsuit: Climate Change, Due Process, and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2017).
9
See, e.g., Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (dismissing plaintiffs’
atmospheric trust suit for lack of standing and, in the alternative, as alleging a nonjusticiable political question); La
Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen, T-1750-19, 2020 F.C. 1008, at ¶ 102 (Can. Ont. Fed. Ct. Oct. 27, 2020) (granting
government’s motion to dismiss because “the public trust doctrine, while justiciable, does not disclose a reasonable
cause of action”) (appeal pending, A-289-20 (Can. Fed. Ct. App. Nov. 24 2020) (PDF available at
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/non-us-case/la-rose-v-her-majesty-the-queen/).
10
See infra pp. 11-18.
11
See infra pp. 9-11.
12
See infra pp. 13-18.
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an atmospheric trust. 13 Judicial embrace is strongest when the relevant constitutional provision
also speaks to principles of inter-generational equity.14 Thus, courts appear to be sensitive to the
long-term challenges inherent in natural resource management and recognize that the sovereign is
in the best position to ensure the continued viability of those resources by exercising its trust duties.
This paper also contends that the atmosphere is subject to the public trust doctrine
whenever plaintiffs allege, with supporting scientific evidence, that their use of traditional public
trust resources has been impaired by climate change. Although courts have not always held that
the atmosphere itself is a public trust resource, several courts have concluded that threats to nontraditional public trust resources are intricately tied to traditional public trust resources.15 In at least
one court’s view, the connection between the atmosphere and navigable waters is sufficient to
bring the atmosphere within the public trust doctrine’s scope as a matter of inter-resource
affectation.16 Relying on the same logic, the public trust doctrine has been expanded by some
courts to include groundwater.17 Those courts have relied on the scientific consensus that ground
and surface waters are interconnected to conclude that when groundwater use affects surface
waters, the groundwater must be managed consistent with the public trust.18 This basic reasoning
should apply with equal force to the atmosphere, the degradation of which has scientifically
demonstrable effects on navigable surface waters.19
This paper presents the emerging best practices associated with applying the public trust
doctrine to the atmosphere in the context of climate change litigation, offering two analytical

13

See id.
See infra pp. 18-22.
15
See infra pp. 22-25.
16
See infra pp. 24-25.
17
See infra pp. 22-24.
18
See id.
19
See Maggie Fox, Climate Change Drying Up Big Rivers, Study Finds, Reuters (Apr. 21, 2009), available at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-rivers/climate-change-drying-up-big-rivers-study-findsidUSTRE53K4MR20090421.
14
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frameworks: 1) constitutional recognition and 2) inter-resource affectation. Section I provides
background on the historical scope of the public trust doctrine, explains the doctrine’s embodiment
of basic trust principles, and explores how courts proceed with interpreting claims under the public
trust doctrine. Section II briefly introduces the problem that atmospheric trust litigation seeks to
address—climate change—and presents examples of judicial recognition of the threats posed by
climate change. Section III explores the first framework, constitutional recognition, under which
courts analyze atmospheric trust claims. Section IV explores the second framework, inter-resource
affectation, under which courts can analyze atmospheric trust claims. The paper concludes that the
public trust doctrine, when analyzed by courts under either of the above frameworks, gives rise to
an atmospheric trust that the sovereign must manage in the public interest and safeguard against
substantial impairment.20
Section I: The Nature of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine represents the “dual concept[s] of sovereign right and
responsibility.”21 As courts see it, “public trust claims are unique because they concern inherent
attributes of sovereignty”22 and do not depend on regulation, statute, or even constitution for their
force.23 One such court further explained that “in its broadest sense, the term ‘public trust’ refers

See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452-53 (holding that any improvements to public trust property may “not
substantially impair the public interest” because the state may not relinquish “control of property in which the public
has an interest”).
21
In re Water Use Permit Applications for Waiahole Ditch (“Waiahole Ditch”), 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000).
22
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016); see also Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 443
(stating that “history and precedent have established the public trust as an inherent attribute of sovereign authority”);
Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 837 (S.D. 2004) (same); Butler v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL
1091209, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013) (explaining that the public trust doctrine is derived “from the inherent
nature of Arizona’s status as a sovereign state”); Mineral Cty. v. Lyons Cty., 473 P.3d 418, 425 (Nev. 2020)
(characterizing the public trust doctrine as being “derive[d] from inherent limitations on a state’s sovereign
powers”).
23
See Oposa v. Factoran, No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, at *9 (1993) (Phil.) (holding that “the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology” belongs to a unique category of basic rights, “for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation […] the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions”) (PDF available at https://www.informea.org/en/court-decision/minors-oposa-v-factoran).
20
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to the fundamental understanding that no government can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign
powers.”24 Indeed, “the public trust imposes on the government an obligation to protect the res of
the trust,” and “a defining feature of that obligation is that it cannot be legislated away.” 25 In other
words, with respect to “essential natural resources,” “the sovereign’s public trust obligations
prevent it from ‘depriving a future legislature of the natural resources necessary to provide for the
well-being and survival of its citizens.’”26 Since it is both a sovereign right and responsibility, the
public trust doctrine empowers the sovereign to hold essential natural resources in trust for the
public and also requires the sovereign to ensure that those resources remain available for public
use and enjoyment.
A. Historical Scope of the Doctrine
In the United States, the public trust doctrine has traditionally dealt with “coastlines,
harbors, and major rivers and lakes,”27 or, simply put, navigable waterways. According to a
respected commentator, “whether valued in terms of economics, recreation, beauty, or
spirituality,” these resources are “among our most valuable.” 28 For example, in the foundational
case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Illinois, like all
sovereigns, holds title to lands beneath its navigable waters “in trust for the people of the state,”
so that “they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.” 29 Thus,

24

Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (citing Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879)).
Id. at 1260; see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 459-60 (explaining that “legislative acts concerning public
interests are necessarily public laws” and holding that “the legislature could not give away nor sell the discretion of
its successors”).
26
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253; see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 459-60 (explaining that “every
succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power as its predecessor” and that “every legislature
must, at the time of its existence, exercise the power of the state in the execution of the trust devolved upon it”).
27
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the
Traditional Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 425, 426 (1989).
28
Id.
29
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.
25
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since its original invocations, the scope of the public trust doctrine in the United States has been
tied to navigable waters and the values they hold as public resources.
Internationally, judicial pronouncement of the public trust doctrine occurred later than in
the United States. But the international public trust has been far less tethered to navigable
waterways.30 For example, in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, the Supreme Court of India explained
that “the public trust doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea,
waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly
unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership.”31 Interestingly, the court cited to the
“ecological” reasoning employed in both state and federal cases from the United States to conclude
that there is “no reason why the public trust doctrine should not be expanded to include all
ecosystems operating [off of] our natural resources.” 32 Although courts in the United States have
accepted ecologically-based arguments to extend the public trust res primarily in the context of
waters, international courts have shown a greater willingness to apply this reasoning to other
natural resources, including whole ecosystems.
B. Basic Trust Principles
According to a recent decision, “the natural resources trust operates according to basic trust
principles, which impose upon the trustee a fiduciary duty to ‘protect the trust property against
damage or destruction.’”33 Because “the trustee owes this duty equally to both current and future
beneficiaries of the trust,”34 the natural resources trust is necessarily intergenerational. Moreover,

30

See generally Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law
and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 741 (2012)
(exploring the relatively broader scope of the public trust doctrine in certain jurisdictions outside of the United
States).
31
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388, at ¶ 25 (India).
32
Id. at ¶ 33 (discussing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988)).
33
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254 (citing George G. Bogert et al., Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees, § 582 (2016)).
34
Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 183 (1959)).
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once “the existence of a fiduciary duty on the part of the State to protect a public resource” has
been established, “the duty would not seem to depend on the source of the threatened harm.” 35 In
other words, the sovereign owes a public trust duty regardless of whether the sovereign is involved
in bringing about harm or a threat of harm to the public trust res.
Moreover, the public trust doctrine imposes three categories of restrictions on the
sovereign’s authority to administer the natural resources trust.36 First, trust property “must not only
be used for a public purpose, but it must [also] be held available for use by the general public.” 37
Second, trust property may never be sold.38 Third, trust property “must be maintained for particular
types of uses.”39 Although “the ‘traditional’ public trust litigation model […] centers on the second
restriction, the prohibition against alienation of a public trust asset,” a wave of modern public trust
litigation asserts that “state and national governments have abdicated their responsibilities under
the public trust doctrine.”40 Under this modern approach, plaintiffs assert that sovereigns “have
violated their duties as trustees by nominally retaining control over trust assets while actually
allowing their depletion and destruction, effectively violating the first and third restrictions by
excluding the public from use and enjoyment of public resources.” 41 In addition to applying the
public trust doctrine to new resources, modern public trust litigation emphasizes the public rights
that sovereigns have a fiduciary obligation to protect.

35

Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088, 1095 (Alaska 2014) (denying declaratory relief because such relief would not
“settle” the legal relations at issue and thus would not advance plaintiffs’ interests).
36
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L.
Rev. 471, 477 (1970).
37
Id.
38
Id.; see also Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 450 (“Although its purpose has evolved over time, the public trust has
never been understood to safeguard rights of exclusive use for private commercial gain. Such an interpretation,
indeed, eviscerates the trust’s basic purpose of reserving the resource for use and access by the general public
without preference or restriction.”).
39
Sax, supra note 36.
40
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254.
41
Id.
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C. Judicial Interpretation of the Public Trust Doctrine
Courts and scholars have recognized that “in natural resources cases, the trust property
consists of a set of resources important enough to the people to warrant public trust protection.” 42
Nonetheless, perhaps the greatest challenge for courts reviewing claims brought under the public
trust doctrine is determining when—that is, to what resources—the doctrine applies. According to
the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i, “the public trust, by its very nature, does not remain fixed for all
time, but must conform to changing needs and circumstances.” 43 As new threats to natural
resources arise, and as the public responds by invoking their rights to the continued use and
enjoyment of those resources, the public trust doctrine is sure to evolve.
The judiciary’s role in this evolution is straightforward. In the words of the Arizona Court
of Appeals, “it is up to the judiciary to determine the scope of the Doctrine.” 44 In Butler v. Brewer,
which concerned an atmospheric trust claim, that court reasoned that when “precedent does not
address the measures by which a resource may be determined to be a part of the public trust or a
framework for analyzing such contentions,” it is appropriate for the court to “assume without
deciding that the atmosphere is a part of the public trust subject to the Doctrine.” 45 According to
the court, “the fact that the only Arizona cases directly addressing the Doctrine did so in the context
of lands underlying navigable watercourses does not mean that the Doctrine in Arizona is limited
to such lands.”46 Instead, “any determination of the scope of the Doctrine depends on the facts
presented in a specific case.” 47 Thus, public trust cases require courts to engage in a fact-intensive
inquiry to determine when the doctrine applies.

Id. (citing Mary C. Wood, A Nature’s Trust; Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age, 167-75 (2014)).
Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 447.
44
Butler, 2013 WL 1091209, at *3.
45
Id. at *6.
46
Id.
47
Id.
42
43
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Not only is it the province of the courts “to determine the threshold question of whether a
particular resource is part of the public trust subject to the Doctrine, but the courts must also
determine whether[,] based on the facts[,] there has been a breach of the trust.” 48 In Kanuk v. State,
which also concerned an atmospheric trust claim, the Supreme Court of Alaska explained that
because Alaskan courts “interpret the public trust doctrine in a constitutional context,” the
judiciary “‘has the constitutionally mandated duty to ensure compliance with the provisions of the
Alaska Constitution’” when it reviews public trust claims. 49 The court held that “whether the State
has breached [its fiduciary] legal duty is a question we are well equipped to answer” once “the
extent of the State’s duty” has been judicially determined based on the facts of the case. 50 If it were
not up to the courts to evaluate when a sovereign has abdicated its public trust duties, such an
inquiry would have no proper forum.
The public trust doctrine applies to important natural resources and is flexible enough to
evolve with changing societal needs. To that end, it is the judiciary’s role to determine both when
a particular resource falls within the doctrine’s scope and when the sovereign has violated or failed
to meet its public trust duties with respect to public trust resources.
Section II: The Threat of Climate Change and the Rise of an Atmospheric Trust
In 2021, some 13,900 scientists from across the globe reaffirmed that planet Earth is
currently facing a “climate emergency.”51 Emphasizing that climate change is not “a stand-alone
environmental problem,” these scientists called for “transformative change […] to protect life on
Earth and remain within as many planetary boundaries as possible.” 52 In addition to calls-to-action

48

Id. at *5.
Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1099.
50
Id. at 1100.
51
William J. Ripple et al., World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency 2021, 71 BioScience 894, 894 (Sept.
2021) (available at https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biab079).
52
Id. at 897.
49
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from scientists, legal scholars have long urged that “our laws and values cannot continue to ignore
the restraints imposed on human activity by our natural environment” in the face of serious threats
to “the public’s legitimate interest in ecological stability and integrity.” 53 Although judges need
not be trained scientists, given the seriousness and complexity of climate change, courts need to
be cognizant of the inherent relationships that tie together all components of the natural world.
These concerns have echoed in courts around the world. For example, the Lahore High
Court of Pakistan has recognized that “climate change is a defining challenge of our time and has
led to dramatic alterations in our planet’s climate system.” 54 In Pakistan, “these climatic variations
have primarily resulted in heavy floods and droughts, raising serious concerns regarding water and
food security.”55 Similarly, as one Washington lower court has summarized,
Washington and the Pacific Northwest have experienced long-term warming, a lengthening
of the frost-free season, and more frequent nighttime heat waves. Sea level is rising on
most of Washington’s coast. Coastal ocean acidity has increased. Glacial area and spring
snowpack have declined, and peak stream flows in many rivers have shifted earlier. In
addition, climate extremes (floods, droughts, fires and landslides) are already costly to
Washington State.56
The rise of atmospheric trust litigation has been the product of an increased understanding within
the international judiciary of the threats posed by climate change and the courts’ role in addressing
those threats.
Section III: The Constitutional Recognition Framework
Many courts have rooted their support for an atmospheric trust in constitutional language
establishing public rights in or the sovereign’s responsibility for air, climate, a healthy

David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the Public’s Interest in
Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 311, 311 (1988).
54
Leghari v. State, (2016) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Pak.), at *5 (PDF available at http://climatecasechart.com/climatechange-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/20150404_2015-W.P.-No.25501201_decision.pdf).
55
Id.
56
Foster v. State Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2017 WL 9772318, at *2 (Wash. Super. April 19,
2017).
53
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environment, or natural resources generally. Judicial embrace is strongest when the relevant
constitutional provision also speaks to principles of inter-generational equity. These courts’
recognition of a broad public trust capable of including the atmosphere illustrates that the doctrine
is subject to judicial expansion.
A. Air and Climate
An atmospheric trust exists where constitutional language establishes public rights in, and
the sovereign’s duty over, the air and/or climate. An example of such language is found in Article
I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which unequivocally states that “the people have a
right to clean air.”57 That provision declares that “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to come,” and requires the state, “as
trustee of these resources,” to “conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.” 58 The
Pennsylvania Constitution therefore embodies two of the three categories of restrictions on the
sovereign’s authority to administer the natural resources trust: trust property must be 1) held
available for public use and 2) maintained for public uses.
In Funk v. Wolf, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth court explained that the first provision
“endows the people of Pennsylvania with the right to the described resources,” thereby
“prevent[ing] the state from acting in ways that would infringe upon such rights.”59 By placing
Pennsylvania’s natural resources—including clean air—in trust for the people, 60 the second
provision enables citizens to bring a legal challenge against government actions and inactions
infringing on the rights recognized in the first provision, proceeding upon either or both of two

57

Pa. Const. art. I, § 27 (1971).
Id.
59
Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), aff’d, 158 A.3d 642 (Mem) (Pa. 2017) (emphasis original)
(denying declaratory relief for lack of practical effect).
60
Id. (citing Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)).
58
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theories: 1) “‘the government has infringed upon citizens’ rights,’” or 2) “‘has failed in its trustee
obligations.’”61 The court thereby recognized the two categories of restrictions imposed by the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
Similarly, in Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, the New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that
the state’s constitution “recognizes that a public trust duty exists for the protection of New
Mexico’s natural resources, including the atmosphere, for the benefit of the people.”62 Section 21
of Article XX of the New Mexico Constitution declares that “the protection of the state’s beautiful
and healthful environment is hereby declared to be of fundamental importance to the public
interest” and requires the state to “provide for control of pollution and control of despoilment of
the air” and other natural resources “for the maximum benefit of the people.” 63 Thus, the court
held, “the State has a duty to protect the atmosphere” pursuant to its clear “constitutional
mandate.”64 The court recognized the same two categories of restrictions in the New Mexico
Constitution—the sovereign must hold natural resources in trust for public use and must maintain
those resources consistent with public uses.
The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i in In re Application of Gas Co. explained that “a state
agency must perform its functions in a manner that fulfills the State’s affirmative obligations under
the Hawai‘i Constitution,” including its obligations as a trustee of “‘all public natural
resources.’”65 Indeed, the Hawai‘i Constitution provides that, “‘for the benefit of present and
future generations, the State […] shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural

61

Id. (quoting Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 950-51 (Pa. 2013)).
Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
the State because plaintiffs failed to allege a constitutional violation, instead requesting judicial review and
intervention as a matter of a “common law public trust doctrine”).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1226-27.
65
In re Application of Gas Co., 465 P.3d 633, 654 (Haw. 2020) (vacating and remanding to the State Public Utilities
Commission to “consider its constitutional obligations” in light of the court’s opinion).
62
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resources, including land, water, air,’” and other resources.66 Thus, the court concluded that “the
state has a continuing duty to monitor the use of trust property, even if the use of the property has
not changed,” and that a state agency’s “constitutional obligations are ongoing.”67
These cases illustrate that where the relevant constitution speaks to public rights in, and
the sovereign’s duty over, the air and/or climate, courts have embraced the atmosphere as within
the scope of the public trust res. Nevertheless, many other courts have reached the same conclusion
where such explicit constitutional language about air and climate is lacking.
B. A Healthy Environment
Several courts have rooted their recognition of an atmospheric trust in constitutional
language that establishes public rights in, and the sovereign’s duty over, a healthy environment.
In Foster v. State Department of Ecology, a Washington lower court accepted petitioners’
characterization that where the public’s “rights to a healthy environment” are protected by
constitution, those rights are actually protected “by the Public Trust Doctrine embodied therein.”68
In other words, constitutional recognition is the recognition of inherent public rights in the
environment.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the Philippines has explained, “the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.”69 The right to a healthy environment therefore mandates not only that the state hold
trust property—in this context, the environment as a whole—available for public use, but also that
the state maintain the environment’s health to ensure the continued viability of the public’s use of
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Id. (emphasis original) (citing Ching v. Case, 449 P.3d 1146, 1175-76 (Haw. 2019)).
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Foster, 2017 WL 9772318, at *1 (allowing petitioners to supplement and amend their petition against the State for
its lack of climate change action).
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trust property. In this way, the right to a healthy environment embodies the first and third categories
of restrictions on the sovereign’s authority to administer the natural resources trust. 70
For example, in Sher Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the National Green Tribunal of
India unequivocally declared that “the citizens of the country have a fundamental right to a
wholesome, clean and decent environment” by virtue of India’s Constitution. 71 Citing to judgments
by the Supreme Court of India from the 1980s onward,72 the court concluded that “Article 21 of
[India’s] Constitution73 has been expanded to take within its ambit the right to a clean and decent
environment” as part of a broader “right to life and personal liberty.”74 The “wide dimensions” of
Article 21, the court explained, have consistently been construed by Indian courts “in the larger
public interest.”75 Therefore, the court held that pursuant to that public interest, “the most vital
necessities, namely air, […] cannot be permitted to be misused or polluted so as to reduce the
quality of life of others.”76 The court also made clear that when the sovereign enacts environmental
statutes and regulations, it must do so consistent with its role as “the trustee of all natural resources
which are by [their] nature meant for public use and enjoyment” and over which “the public at
large is the beneficiary.”77 Thus, the court signaled its willingness to review legislation for
consistency with the public trust doctrine.78
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See Sax, supra note 36.
Sher Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2014) App. No. 237 (THC)/2013 (CWPIL No. 15 of 2010), at *5 (PDF
available at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-casedocuments/2014/20140206_2013-CWPIL-No.-15-of-2010_opinion.pdf).
72
See Rural Litig. & Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2187 (India);
Virender Gaur v. State of Haryana, (1995) 2 S.C.C. 577 (India).
73
India Const. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law.”).
74
Sher Singh, App. No. 237 (THC)/2013, at *5-6.
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Id. at *7.
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Id. at *9-10.
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Id. at *11 (citing M.C. Mehta, 1 S.C.C. 388).
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Similarly, the Lahore High Court of Pakistan in Leghari v. State began its decision by
recognizing that “climate change is a defining challenge of our time and has led to dramatic
alterations in our planet’s climate system.”79 Against this backdrop, the court determined that “on
a legal and constitutional plane,” climate change presents a “clarion call for the protection of
fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan.” 80 Thus, the court pointed to “fundamental rights”
in Pakistan’s Constitution, emphasizing that such rights “read with constitutional principles of
democracy, equality, [and] social, economic and political justice.” 81 The court focused on Article
9,82 the right to life, “which includes the right to a healthy and clean environment,” and Article
14,83 the right to human dignity.84
The court concluded that these fundamental rights also “include within their ambit and
commitment” numerous environmental principles such as “inter and intra-generational equity and
[the] public trust doctrine.”85 In fact, according to the court, environmental protection has taken
“center stage” in Pakistan’s scheme of constitutional rights.86 The court was thus satisfied that the
fundamental rights articulated in Articles 9 and 14, bolstered by Article 23’s right to property and
Article 19(A)’s right to information, provided “the necessary judicial toolkit to address and
monitor the Government’s response to climate change.” 87 Therefore, the court held that the
sovereign could not continue on its course of “delay and lethargy,” and thereby “offend[] the
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Leghari, W.P. No. 25501/2015, at *5.
Id.
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Id. at *5-6.
82
Pakistan Const. art. 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law.”).
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Pakistan Const. art. 14 § 1 (“The dignity of man and, subject to law, the privacy of home, shall be inviolable.”).
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Leghari, W.P. No. 25501/2015, at *5-6.
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fundamental rights of the citizens which need to be safeguarded,” with respect to climate change
action.88
These cases show that where the relevant constitution speaks to public rights in, and the
sovereign’s duty over, a healthy environment, courts have concluded that the atmosphere is within
the scope of the public trust res. This right to a healthy environment is inherent in other
constitutionally enumerated fundamental rights. This trend—which has a particularly strong
presence in international jurisprudence outside of the United States—indicates that courts
understand a stable climate system as necessary to environmental health and wellbeing.
C. Natural Resources
Some courts have grounded their recognition of an atmospheric trust in constitutional
language that establishes public rights in, and the sovereign’s duty over, natural resources
generally, even absent an explicit reference to air or climate. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted, when “natural resources” appears, unqualified, in constitutional language, “the term fairly
implicates relatively broad aspects of the environment, and is amenable to change over time to
conform, for example, with the development of related legal and societal concerns.” 89 Indeed, the
public trust doctrine is an adaptable legal tool for natural resource protection.
In Bonser-Lain v. State Commission on Environmental Quality, a Texas lower court was
unpersuaded by the state commission’s contention that “the public trust doctrine in Texas is
exclusively limited to the conservation of the State’s waters,” finding this argument “legally
invalid.”90 Instead, the court held that “the public trust doctrine includes all natural resources of
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Id.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955.
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Bonser-Lain v. State Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 3164561, at *1 (Tex. Dist.
Aug. 2, 2012) (holding that the State Commission nonetheless had discretion not to proceed with plaintiffs’ request
for rulemaking), vacated, State Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Bonser-Lain, 438 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2014)
(vacating on the ground that plaintiffs lacked a right to judicial review of an agency’s refusal to adopt rules under
Texas State law).
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the State including the air and atmosphere.”91 The court reasoned that the doctrine had been
incorporated into section 59 of Article XVI of the Texas Constitution, which provides that the
conservation, development, and preservation “of all of the natural resources of this State” are
“declared public rights and duties,” and therefore recognizes an expansive public trust res.92
In Held v. State, the Montana lower court held that the state’s practice of ignoring climate
change when approving energy projects may implicate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.93
Following Montana Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that “a clean and healthful
environment is a ‘fundamental right’” under Article IX of the Montana Constitution,94 and that
this right is linked to the state’s obligation “‘to prevent unreasonable degradation of natural
resources.’”95 Thus, while not using “public trust” language, the court recognized that the inclusion
of a state duty over natural resources in the Montana Constitution provides “‘protections which
are both anticipatory and preventative.’”96 Indeed, the Montana Constitution does not force the
state into allowing a “‘degree of environmental degradation which can be conclusively linked to
ill health or physical endangerment’” before the state’s “‘farsighted environmental protections can
be invoked.’”97 Instead, the state has an affirmative duty to protect natural resources from
substantial impairment. 98
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Id.
Id.
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Held v. State, No. CDV-2020-307, at *14 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2021) (allowing plaintiffs’ claim for
declaratory relief to proceed while denying a claim for injunctive relief) (PDF available at
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2021/20210804_docket-CDV-2020-307_order.pdf).
94
Id. at *13-14 (quoting Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999)
(citing Mont. Const. art. IX § 1(1) (“The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful
environment in Montana for present and future generations.”))).
95
Id. (quoting Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249 (citing Mont. Const. art. IX § 1(3) (“The legislature shall
provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and provide
adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.”))).
96
Id. at *15 (quoting Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249).
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Id. (quoting Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249).
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Mont. Const. art. IX § 1(3), quoted supra note 95.
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These cases demonstrate that where the relevant constitution speaks to public rights in, and
the sovereign’s duty over, natural resources, courts have interpreted such language to recognize
resources beyond those traditionally associated with the public trust doctrine—including the
atmosphere—as within the scope of the public trust res. Although language to the effect of “natural
resources” does not bring about the same clear reference to the atmosphere as language concerning
the air or climate, broad constitutional language may allow for greater judicial flexibility as the
public trust doctrine continues to be applied to new resources and challenges.
D. Inter-Generational Equity
Constitutional language that speaks to inter-generational equity strengthens a court’s
application of the public trust—in particular, where that application is to non-traditional public
trust resources such as the atmosphere—by establishing a temporal relationship that mirrors basic
trust principles. Because a trustee owes her duty “equally to both current and future beneficiaries
of the trust,”99 the sovereign owes its duties to current and future generations and cannot sanction
substantial impairment of the trust res solely to serve present-day needs.100 Even when courts have
not used “public trust” language, their discussion of the sovereign’s inter-generational duties with
respect to natural resources fits within public trust doctrine jurisprudence.
For example, in Urgenda Foundation v. The State of The Netherlands, the Hague District
Court held that “Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution 101 imposes a duty of care on the State relating
to the liveability [sic] of the country and the protection and improvement of the living
environment.”102 To determine whether the sovereign was “taking sufficient mitigation measures”
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Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1254 (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 183 (1959)).
See, e.g., Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1(1) (mandating a “healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations”).
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Ned. Const. art. 21 (“It shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country habitable and to protect and
improve the environment.”).
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Urgenda Found. v. The Netherlands, Hague District Court, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (2015), at *38 (PDF
available at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case100
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with respect to climate change to meet its duty of care, the court engaged in a two-part inquiry.103
First, the court asked whether there was an “unlawful hazardous negligence on the part of the
State,” and second, the court assessed the government’s actions in light of “the State’s
discretionary power.”104 Simply put, the court sought to discern whether the state’s duty of care
had been triggered and, if so, what actions the state needed to take to meet that duty.105
The court determined that the “high risk of dangerous climate change with severe and lifethreatening consequences for man and the environment” triggered the state’s “obligation to protect
its citizens from [climate change] by taking appropriate and effective measures,” 106 including
mitigation as plaintiffs had requested. 107 In other words, the state’s duty of care was triggered by
the imminence and dangerousness of climate change. 108 Stressing that “the possibility of damages
for those whose interests Urgenda represents, including current and future generations of Dutch
nationals, is so great and concrete,” the court ruled that, “given its duty of care, the State must
make an adequate contribution […] to prevent hazardous climate change.” 109 Thus, satisfied that
the state’s duty of care was triggered, the court ruled that the state was obliged to take mitigating
and remedial measures. 110
Similarly, in Neubauer v. State, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany held that “the
fundamental right to the protection of life and health enshrined in” Article 2 of Germany’s

documents/2015/20150624_2015-HAZA-C0900456689_decision-1.pdf) (aff’d on other grounds, The Netherlands v.
Urgenda Found., Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:102 (2019)).
103
Id. at *43.
104
Id.
105
See id.
106
Id. at *47.
107
Id. at *49.
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See id.
109
Id. at *50.
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See id.
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Constitution111 “imposes on the state a general duty of protection of life and physical integrity,”
and therefore “obliges the state to afford protection against the risks of climate change.” 112
According to the court, this fundamental right “encompasses the state’s duty to protect and
promote the legal interests of life and physical integrity and to safeguard these interests against
unlawful interference by others.” 113 In other words, the court equated the state’s obligation to
protect against climate change with the sovereign’s public trust duty to safeguard against
substantial impairment to the public trust res.114
The German court emphasized that the state’s duty “does not take effect only after
violations have already occurred,” but is instead an affirmative duty “oriented towards the future”
that can also be invoked “to protect future generations.”115 The protection required of the state, the
court continued, “encompasses protection against impairments and degradation of constitutionally
guaranteed interests caused by environmental pollution, regardless of who or what circumstances
are the cause.”116 The inter-generational scope of this protection, the court reasoned, was necessary
“in view of the considerable risks” posed by “increasingly severe climate change.” 117 The court’s
reasoning here recognizes the reality that future generations will be forced to grapple with
amplified climate effects.
Although affording protection to both present and future generations, the German court
distinguished between present and future climate change and the sovereign’s duties with respect

Ger. Const. art. 2 § 2 (“Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person
shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law.”).
112
Neubauer v. State, Federal Constitutional Court, 1 BvR 2656/18, Mar. 24, 2021 (Ger.), at *42 (PDF available at
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-casedocuments/2021/20210429_11817_judgment-1.pdf).
113
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to addressing each.118 As to present climate change that “is not preventable or has already taken
place,” the court held that the state is obligated “to address the risks by implementing positive
measures aimed at alleviating the consequences of climate change.” 119 As to future climate change,
on the other hand, the court held that the state is obligated “to afford protection by taking measures
that help to limit anthropogenic global warming and [] associated climate change.”120 Again, the
court’s reasoning here illustrates its understanding of the disproportionate climate effects future
generations will face, leading the court to distinguish present-day mitigation from actual limits
designed to slow additional climate change. 121
In this case, the German legislature had set interim goals with gradual steps to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions 122 and an overall goal “of achieving climate neutrality in the foreseeable
future.”123 Although the court concluded that the legislative provisions challenged by plaintiffs
had not ascertainably violated the state’s duty of protection to the present generation, 124 the court
nonetheless concluded that those provisions did, in fact, violate the state’s duty of protection to
future generations.125 The court faulted the legislature for “failing to take sufficient precautionary
measures to manage the obligations to reduce emissions in ways that respect fundamental rights –
obligations that could be substantial in later periods due to the emissions allowed by law until
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2030.”126 Thus, while meeting its obligation to the present generation, the German legislature’s
climate goals were not enough to meet the sovereign’s obligation to future generations. 127
These cases illustrate that where the relevant constitution speaks to inter-generational
equity in connection with the sovereign’s duties to the public, courts have used this language to
aid their embrace of an atmospheric trust. Given the long-term, far-reaching threats posed by
climate change and the degradation of an inherently “public” resource—the air we breathe—these
courts also appear to impose a higher burden of proof on the sovereign to show that it is complying
with its public trust duties with respect to present and future generations.
Section IV: The Inter-Resource Affectation Framework
Although courts have not always concluded that the atmosphere itself is a public trust
resource, several have concluded that threats to non-traditional public trust resources are intricately
tied to traditional public trust resources. In those courts’ view, this relationship—which this paper
terms “inter-resource affectation”—brings plaintiffs’ claims within the scope of the public trust
doctrine. In this way, courts can recognize an atmospheric trust without explicitly defining the
scope of the public trust res. Several cases help to illustrate this framework, although they
primarily arise in the United States, where the existence of a federalist system of dual sovereigns—
the federal government and the states—has produced different definitions of the public trust in
different jurisdictions.
A. Establishing the Framework
The principle of inter-resource affectation is perhaps best illustrated by courts’ recognition
of groundwater as within the scope of the res subject to the public trust doctrine even though
groundwater is not a traditional public trust resource. For example, in Waiahole Ditch, the Supreme
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Court of Hawai‘i concluded that there was “little sense in adhering to artificial distinctions”
between groundwater and surface waters—a distinction not “borne out in the present practical
realities of this state.”128 The court reasoned that “in other states, the ‘purposes’ or ‘uses’ of the
public trust have evolved with changing public values and needs,” including the recognition of a
“distinct public interest in resource protection.” 129 Moreover, the court recognized that “modern
science and technology have discredited the surface-ground dichotomy” and instead acknowledge
“‘the unity of the hydrological cycle.’” 130 Therefore, the court deferred to a state commission’s
invocation of the precautionary principle 131 to protect instream water uses, agreeing that “public
trust purposes” (public use of the public trust res) should prevail over diversionary interests.132 In
reaching its decision, the court was persuaded by the underlying scientific consensus that certain
natural resources—here, ground and surface waters—form two parts of a larger, interconnected
system.
Similarly, in Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Board, the
California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the public trust doctrine applies
to groundwater if extraction “‘adversely impacts a navigable waterway.’”133 In other words, where
“the removal of water will have an adverse impact on navigable water clearly within the public
trust,” the court was satisfied that it could evaluate the removal for compliance with the public
trust doctrine.134 Given judicial embrace of an inter-resource affectation framework in the
groundwater context, courts have paved the way for this framework to apply to other non-

128

Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 447.
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traditional public trust resources where their degradation impairs navigable waterways clearly
within the traditional public trust res.
B. Application to the Atmosphere
An application of the inter-resource affectation framework in the atmospheric trust context
is found in Juliana v. United States. In Juliana, 21 youth plaintiffs argued that numerous
government entities 135 were violating their “obligation to hold certain natural resources in trust for
the people and for future generations” by deliberately allowing atmospheric carbon dioxide
concentrations to reach unprecedented levels. 136 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the
government defendants “violated their duties as trustees by failing to protect the atmosphere,
water, seas, seashores, and wildlife.” 137 The defendants countered that “plaintiffs’ public trust
claims fail because the complaint focuses on harm to the atmosphere, which is not a public trust
asset.”138 The federal District Court for the District of Oregon, however, decided that it was
unnecessary “to determine whether the atmosphere is a public trust asset” given that plaintiffs had
“alleged violations of the public trust doctrine in connection with the territorial sea,” a resource
long recognized as within the public trust res.139
The Juliana court concluded that “because a number of plaintiffs’ injuries relate to the
effects of ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures,” plaintiffs had “adequately alleged
harm to public trust assets.”140 The court was satisfied that harm to the atmosphere that in turn
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These entities included then-President of the United States Barack Obama, the Council on Environmental
Quality, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Department of
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impairs long-recognized public trust resources implicates the public trust doctrine, effectively
applying the inter-resource affectation framework.141 This reasoning is consistent with prior
judicial practice of looking past artificial distinctions between natural resources to expand the
application of the public trust doctrine beyond those resources traditionally within the public trust
res.142
C. Interaction with Constitutional Recognition
The two frameworks discussed above clearly contemplate some degree of overlap: under
the constitutional recognition framework, sovereigns recognize—and courts adhere to—the
ecological importance of protecting air, climate, a healthy environment, and natural resources.
Under the inter-resource affectation framework, courts also recognize the inherent ecological ties
between navigable waters and other resources. Therefore, application of the inter-resource
affectation framework is strongest when coupled with a constitutional grounding.
For example, the Juliana court implicated the atmosphere in the public trust doctrine’s
scope as a matter of inter-resource affectation. 143 But in Juliana, the court also considered
plaintiffs’ claims on constitutional grounds based in the U.S. Constitution’s due process clause.144
Because the court determined that public trust rights were implicit in due process,145 this
constitutional grounding provided the court with a catalyst to vindicate plaintiffs’ public trust

See also Foster v. State Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362, at *4 (Wash. Super. Nov.
19, 2015) (explaining that “current science makes clear that global warming is impacting the acidification of the
oceans to alarming and dangerous levels, thus endangering the bounty of our navigable waters”) (abrogated by Aji P.
v. State, 480 P.3d 438 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021)); Future Generations v. State Ministry of Env’t, STC4360-2018
(Colom. 2018), at *34 (explaining that “deforestation in the Amazon […] leads to rampant emissions of carbon
dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, producing the greenhouse gas effect, which in turn transforms and fragments
ecosystems, altering water sources and the water supply for population centers”) (translated excerpts by Dejusticia,
PDF available at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/non-us-case/future-generation-v-ministryenvironment-others/).
142
See supra pp. 22-24.
143
See supra pp. 24-25.
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rights. Although the sovereign’s public trust duties exist independent of any constitutional
recognition, where plaintiffs (and courts) point to a constitutional provision that contemplates the
public’s right to enforce those duties, such constitutional grounding can act as a vehicle for judicial
recognition of public trust rights.
In Juliana, in addition to their public trust claims, the youth plaintiffs argued that numerous
government entities were violating plaintiffs’ “substantive due process rights to life, liberty, and
property” by deliberately allowing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations to reach
unprecedented levels. 146 The court agreed, holding that plaintiffs had “adequately alleged
infringement of a fundamental right.”147 According to the court, “where a complaint alleges
governmental action is affirmatively and substantially damaging the climate system in a way that
will cause human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage to property,
threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem, it states a claim for a
due process violation.”148 As the court saw it, “to hold otherwise would be to say that the
Constitution affords no protection against a government’s knowing decision to poison the air its
citizens breathe or the water its citizens drink.”149 In other words, such fundamental rights need
not be explicitly stated in a constitution in order to benefit from constitutional protection.
The Juliana court held that “plaintiffs’ public trust rights both predated the [U.S.]
Constitution and are secured by it,” although “plaintiffs’ right of action to enforce the
government’s obligations as trustee arises from the Constitution.” 150 The court explained that “the
Due Process Clause’s substantive component safeguards fundamental rights that are ‘implicit in
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the concept of ordered liberty’ or ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” 151
According to the court, “plaintiffs’ public trust rights, related as they are to inherent aspects of
sovereignty and the consent of the governed from which the United States’ authority derives,
satisfy both tests.”152 In other words, the due process clause—and its protection of fundamental
rights—acted as a vehicle for the court to consider plaintiffs’ fundamental public trust rights. 153
The Juliana court’s discussion of substantive due process indicates that where the relevant
constitution does not contain express language establishing public rights in or the sovereign’s
responsibility for air, climate, a healthy environment, or natural resources, the strength of a
plaintiff’s atmospheric trust claim can rest upon the ties she establishes between climate change
and traditional public trust resources—that is, upon inter-resource affectation. For example, in Aji
P. v. State, youth plaintiffs contended that they had “alleged valid public trust doctrine claims” in
their complaint against the State of Washington for its reliance on fossil fuels because “‘navigable
waters and the atmosphere are intertwined.’”154 In the plaintiffs’ view, “‘to argue a separation of
the two, or to argue that [greenhouse gas] emissions do not affect navigable waters,’” would be
“‘nonsensical’” on the State’s part. 155 However, looking to the Washington State Constitution,
which enumerates the traditional definition of state ownership over the beds and shores of
navigable waters, the court disagreed.156
The court concluded that the “complaint alleges a violation of the public trust doctrine in
relation to the climate system as a whole, including the atmosphere,” whereas “Washington has
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not yet expanded the public trust doctrine to encompass the atmosphere.”157 Although plaintiffs
maintained that they “‘alleged impairment to traditional Public Trust Resources such as navigable
waters and submerged lands,’” the court was unpersuaded.158 In fact, the court deemed this a
“recharacterization” of plaintiffs’ allegations, paying particular attention to plaintiffs’ assertion in
their complaint that “‘the overarching public trust resource is the climate system, which
encompasses the atmosphere, waters, oceans, and biosphere.’” 159 In other words, by framing the
“‘effect on the public’s ability to use, access, enjoy and navigate the state’s tidelands, shorelands,
and navigable waters’” as a symptom of climate change,160 plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the
court’s limited reading of the public trust doctrine in the context of narrow constitutional language.
Nonetheless, Aji P. does not foreclose atmospheric trust claims that are more explicitly
rooted in impairment to traditional public trust resources. Referring to climate change impacts “on
already-recognized public trust resources such as water, shorelines, wildlife, and fish,” the
Supreme Court of Alaska has recognized that “allegations that the State has breached its duties
with regard to the management of these resources do not depend on a declaratory judgment about
the atmosphere.”161 Therefore, a court need not decide that the atmosphere is itself a public trust
resource to consider the impacts of climate change on traditional public trust resources as a matter
of inter-resource affectation.
Had the Aji P. plaintiffs claimed that greenhouse gas emissions, particularly dissolved
carbon dioxide, create higher river and stream temperatures that impair the public’s ability to fish
and recreate in those waters, the court would have been more likely to see this injury as directly
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tied to plaintiffs’ use of traditional public trust resources. Likewise, the navigability of traditionally
navigable waters has been and continues to be threatened by climate change. 162 Because climate
change stresses water availability and thereby alters the structure of rivers and streams, 163 a claim
of impairment to navigability could bolster an atmospheric trust claim where a plaintiff is unable
to assist her position with helpful constitutional language. In other words, alleging impairment to
navigable waterways as a result of climate change, rather than alleging impairment to the climate
that in turn affects navigable waterways, frames the issue in terms that are more closely aligned
with a limited reading of a narrow state doctrine.
Conclusion
Emerging best practices for applying the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere in the
context of climate change litigation exist as two analytical frameworks: 1) constitutional
recognition and 2) inter-resource affectation. Under the first framework, constitutional recognition,
sovereigns recognize—and courts enforce—the ecological importance of protecting air, climate, a
healthy environment, and natural resources based on constitutional language establishing public
rights to, and the sovereign’s duty over, such resources. Under the second framework, interresource affectation, courts recognize the inherent ecological ties between navigable waters and
other resources, and thus implicate the atmosphere within the public trust doctrine’s scope, even
if the court does not define the atmosphere as part of the public trust res. When litigants posture
courts to invoke either of the above frameworks, the public trust doctrine gives rise to an
atmospheric trust that the sovereign must manage in the public interest consistent with trust
principles.
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